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Abstract
This note examines some issues involved in an attempt to go beyond the assumption, long-made by 
most economists, that people’s preferences are simply to be treated as “given” and that the principle 
of  consumer sovereignty entails a refusal to consider some (or some people’s) revealed preferences 
as more authoritative than others. The most important break with that assumption has been the 
development of  behavioral economics, which shows that people may not always know what they 
really want, and that economists have to develop a more critical approach, distinguishing people’s 
true preferences from those that are merely apparent. While this approach, a version of  which is 
proposed by Michael Woodford, might very well be needed to explain various otherwise mysteri-
ous ways in which actual societies defy economists’ predictions based on the assumption of  purely 
rational behavior, it also involves a danger of  replacing an empirical investigation of  human choice 
with a normative account of  what people should chose--or might chose under some sort of  “ideal 
conditions” that reduce the diversity of  human preferences to merely erroneous deviations from 
what reason and human nature demand. To solve this conundrum, economics might need to incor-
porate a more robust theory of  human choice, perhaps along the lines proposed by Robert Shiller 
and Edmund Phelps. Such a theory would bring economics closer to other social sciences, such as 
history, psychology, and maybe even ethics and aesthetics.
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It may be somewhat surprising to see a group of  economists celebrating the anniversary of  
Martin Luther’s 95 Theses by considering the significance of  his ideas for economic thought. 
Luther did not have much, and clearly nothing of  importance, to say on any subject that 
we would today consider directly related to economic analysis. But perhaps not surprisingly, 
Luther’s focus on the central place of  the individual and his de-emphasis of  the role of  
the community in mediating the relation between human beings and God—understood 
as the ultimate measure of  any worth in this world—is something that naturally resonates 
with economists, who believe that individual preferences, rather than communal choices, 
constitute the basis of  the economic system. 
To be sure, unlike economists’ stress on consumer sovereignty, which sees the 
individual as free to pursue his own goals rather than conforming to the value choices and 
opinions of  others, Luther’s emphasis on faith as the sole basis of  salvation focuses more 
on the hardship than on emancipation as the main consequence of  individual responsibility. 
Indeed, Luther’s rejection of  the idea that participation in an earthly community can help 
save one from damnation leaves the individual alone and essentially powerless in his striving 
for the highest human good of  salvation. Still, an examination of  the difficulties inherent 
in an often simplistic idea of  individual preferences underlying much of  modern economic 
theory may reveal that pursuing some implications of  Luther’s individualism can open the 
way to a more fruitful development of  economic theory in the future.
Let’s start with the increasingly controversial idea at the core of  yesterday’s (and 
still largely today’s) economic theory: that individual preferences, taken as the ultimate basis 
of  human actions and the driving force of  economic developments, are to be treated as 
simply “given” and “revealed” by the subjects. As Michael Woodford1 and other behavioral 
economists point out, things are more complicated because people’s preferences are often 
inconsistent and unreliable; under many circumstances, people might “reveal” preferences 
that we have reason to believe are, in some sense, not really theirs. Moreover, as Robert Shiller’s 
recent work2 suggests, we may need to go beyond the behaviorist account and provide a 
social theory of  preference formation, which explains how various “narratives” about reality 
spread among economic agents and influence their behavior. Indeed, Edmund Phelps3 goes 
still further by arguing that neo-classical economics cannot account for the transformative 
moments in economic history, such as explosive growth and decline of  productivity, without 
reference to broader cultural forces that affect dynamism and innovation.
All these critiques suggest that neglecting the intricacies of  how people come to 
1 See Michael Woodford’s contribution to this issue: “Individualistic Welfare Analysis in the Age of  Behav-
ioral Science,” Capitalism and Society 13, no. 1 (September 2018).
2 Robert J. Shiller, “Narrative Economics,” American Economic Review 107, no. 4 (April 2017): 967–1004.
3 Edmund Phelps, Mass Flourishing (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013).
Rapaczynski: Economic Individualism and Preference Formation
4
form and reveal their preferences weakens the foundations of  economic theory and impairs 
economists’ ability to explain some widely observed distortions of  expected outcomes. On 
the other hand, the possibility that people’s preferences, as revealed in a fairly simple and 
uncontroversial fashion, may not in fact be “really” theirs also opens a host of  complex 
issues that may not be easily handled with the standard tools economists have used in 
the past. Insights and methods from other fields of  scientific analysis, such as behavioral 
psychology or neurological science, may be of  some help. But a robust theory of  how 
human beings come to have these or other preferences and make choices determining their 
behavior is likely to bring us back to many old philosophical, political, and ethical dilemmas 
that economics was supposed to finesse in favor of  a more “scientific” account. 
To say that individual preferences are not simply “given” and that people may be 
“wrong” about what they really want can mean two very different things. It may point to 
a cognitive difficulty: the researcher (and the subject himself) may have trouble finding out 
what the subject really wants because the subject’s habitual behavior makes him incapable 
of  properly assessing the consequences of  his actions, or because there is some “noise” in 
the circumstances under which the question is posed. But in the other case, the researcher 
may be making a normative claim: there is no doubt about what the subject in fact wants, but 
the subject’s preferences are still not considered really his because they are in another sense 
wrong—they are not “objectively” in the subject’s best interest and the subject should not hold 
them.
In fact, we are dealing here with two different understandings of  what it means for an 
individual to have a preference, or of  the way in which a preference belongs to an individual. 
At one extreme, self-revelation—the subject’s actual identification of  a preference as his or 
her own—is an indispensable anchor of  what is in the true interest of  the subject. Without 
such an identification, an external observer may perhaps believe that something I don’t 
recognize as such is nevertheless in my best interest (as defined in terms of  some objective 
criteria). But this is still not enough to identify the relevant “objectively better” preferences 
as in any sense mine or—and this is crucial—to substitute the observer’s desire to make me 
better off  for the choice that I, wisely or not, have made myself.4 
On this understanding, the subjective state of  having a preference is definitional 
with respect to one’s “true” interest, and indeed to one’s very personal identity. In other 
4 It has been suggested by Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler that individuals may be “nudged” toward a 
choice that policymakers are confident reflects better the agents’ true interests than the alternatives the agents 
themselves may think they prefer. While there may be a cost to an agent who insists on his own choices and 
does not follow the policymakers’ suggestions, the very fact that a “nudge” does not really force anyone to 
do anything—so that the agent’s own choice is the ultimate criterion of  his interest—is the reason Sunstein 
and Thaler believe that nudging is not illegitimate. See: Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Im-
proving Decisions About Health, Wealth, And Happiness (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008). 
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words, all kinds of  my likes and dislikes are at the core of  who I am, even if  others don’t 
share them or if  acting on them may be self-defeating. In this context, for an external 
observer to say that the subject is mistaken about what she really wants at most amounts to a 
prediction that, when confronted with more facts or helped to understand the source of  her 
error, the subject herself  will simply recognize that she was wrong in what she thought she 
wanted. On the other hand, if  the subject resists such corrective attempts, the observer may 
come to believe that the subject is not wise, but the observer cannot deny that the subject’s 
own choice is a defining element of  what is in her interest. By analogy, I may believe that your 
preference for Warhol over Matisse is very foolish, but unless and until I persuade you that 
Matisse is a better artist, I cannot say that you are making a mistake about what you “really” 
like. Given how constitutive aesthetic preferences are with respect to our personal identity, 
what I am saying in the end is that I would prefer you to be a different person than you in 
fact are.
At the other extreme is an objectivist view of  human identity that, outside of  a 
narrow area of  ethics, finds few open adherents today, but which used to be held by many 
people, including most communists and quite a few religious believers. According to this 
view, what is “good” for human beings is essentially a matter of  objective knowledge, so a 
better-informed person (perhaps a wise leader) might know better than I do what my true 
needs are, and thus also what I really want. From the objectivist perspective, the opposite of  
a “true” preference is not a preference that is merely apparent, but one that is normatively 
“wrong.” When I am wrong in this sense, the problem is not just with my self-knowledge; it 
goes to the very core of  who I am. Indeed, if  I do not change my mind about what I want, 
my actual preference will carry no authority because it does not correspond to what will 
make me live in accordance with my true nature and pursue my real needs and desires. To 
be sure, proper education (or indoctrination) may bring me to see the light, but the light is 
the light whether or not I see it, and—to paraphrase Jean-Jacques Rousseau5—the individual 
might in the end be forced to be “authentically” himself.
To be sure, there is an area of  human choices in which many people still believe that 
the objectivist account is right: the domain of  ethics or basic moral judgments. The choice 
to kill someone or betray a friend is not thought to be a matter of  individual preference, 
but rather a violation of  an objective imperative that every agent must obey. It is possible, 
of  course, to say that a person violating these kinds of  ethical rules has a “preference” to 
harm someone, and deserves punishment precisely because such preferences are a result 
of  his choices and reflect his personal identity. But unlike in the case of  most preferences 
considered by an economist committed to the concept of  consumer sovereignty—which 
implies that each individual’s preference counts in the same way as a preference of  any other 
5 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, book 1, chap. 7.
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economic agent—a preference violating a moral principle does not carry any authority and 
is seen as conferring no legitimacy on its satisfaction.6
Moral rules may therefore be seen as fixed, general constraints, derived from the 
principles of  reason or from a general theory of  human nature, and not subject to individual 
differences. But a broad objectivist view that sees all (or even just most) human preferences 
as similarly constrained is clearly incompatible with recognizing a wide diversity of  legitimate 
individual life plans, and thus with the commitment to individualism underlying the market 
economy (and probably the very idea of  human freedom). 
Perhaps in response to this objection, some thinkers have tried to marry the 
objectivist approach with the acknowledgement of  individual choice by deploying the so-
called “contractarian” approach. According to this approach, the best interest of  an individual 
may still be seen as consisting in what the individual ultimately chooses for himself; the 
choice in question, however, is not any choice, but one that would be made under some sort 
of  ideal conditions.
Now “ideal conditions” is an ambiguous and potentially theory-laden term. It may 
simply and uncontroversially mean that people’s preferences have more authority when 
formed in the absence of  undue pressure and with access to proper information. I am 
pretty sure this is what Woodford has in mind when he talks about “ideal conditions.” True, 
Woodford does say that economists and policymakers can arrive at a guess of  what an 
individual would choose under such conditions without being able to observe the actual 
choice of  the preferences they are imputing to the subject. Nonetheless, the question remains 
always fundamentally empirical and, like all empirical hypotheses, subject to experimental 
falsification. At no point does Woodford ask what the subject should choose, but rather what 
she will choose under certain conditions designed to help her make a better decision according 
to her own lights. The observer’s claim about a subject’s true preference in such a case does not 
involve any norm by which the agent is bound, but is just a prediction of  what the subject will in 
fact choose when some objectively determined obstacles to self-knowledge are eliminated.
The same is not necessarily true when someone like John Rawls asks what choices 
would be made in an “original position” under a “veil of  ignorance,” 7 or when Jürgen 
Habermas speaks of  “ideal speech conditions.” 8 Both of  these philosophers are committed 
6 It is noteworthy, however, that some economic thinkers, especially law-and-economics theorists, do tend 
to reduce moral reasoning to standard cost-benefit analysis, and are thus ready to weigh the satisfaction of  a 
criminal’s preference against the harm to the victims. An often-cited example is Judge Posner’s analysis of  the 
criminalization of  rape with the help of  a comparison of  the utility of  a rapist with the disutilities of  the rest 
of  society. See Richard A. Posner, “An Economic Theory of  the Criminal Law,” Columbia Law Review 85, no. 
6 (October 1985): 1193-1231.
7 John Rawls, A Theory of  Justice (Cambridge: Belknap Press of  Harvard University Press, 1971).
8 Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of  Communicative Action (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984).
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to a legitimization of  social and economic arrangements by uncoerced choices of  individuals, 
and both of  their theories contain nuances that are difficult to summarize. Still, the insistence 
by both on the possibility of  consensus with respect to a rather comprehensive model of  
human life suggests that the question of  what would be chosen under ideal conditions may 
very well cease to be an empirical one and turn on an a priori reasoning, such as the one 
characteristic of  mathematical or ethical propositions. The very idea of  a “veil of  ignorance” 
strips individuals of  all qualities that distinguish them from one another and assumes that 
all rational beings are in most important respects the same. But then we are not dealing with 
any “contract,” and nothing depends on what choices will in fact be made. In the end, it is 
a single self  that decides everything on the basis of  the rules of  reason alone and, much 
as in the case of  Immanuel Kant’s categorical imperative, the metaphor of  the “veil of  
ignorance” (or other “ideal conditions”) in fact stands for the a priori character of  the results. 
If  you don’t agree with the outcome, you are not making any real choice—you are simply 
not being rational, much as when you commit a logical or an arithmetical mistake.
This is exactly what makes the ideal-conditions device problematic: when so 
understood, it becomes incompatible with a robust theory of  human freedom and individual 
choice. Apart from some basic moral decisions, human choices contain a genuine element 
of  contingency and are not in fact subject to such overpowering constraints that they can be 
simply deduced from the concept of  pure rationality. Indeed, it is this element of  contingency 
that poses a true challenge for both an economic theory of  preference formation and a 
more general theory of  action underlying the economic account of  human behavior. 
Whether human preferences are seen as an object of  a strictly empirical or of  an essentially 
normative inquiry, preferences are often assumed to be static: already there and subject 
to proper discovery. In fact, however, regardless of  how good the economists’ methods 
of  error correction are in assessing human preferences, the job does not really end there 
because the very object of  the study may be in a state of  flux. As Shiller points out, human 
preferences are not really “given” at all, either in the sense of  the subjects having a set of  
stable inclinations, or in the sense of  there being a set of  unequivocally right choices that, 
under certain conditions, rational individuals can be confidently expected to make. Indeed, 
even perfectly rational individuals—as long as they are human—may not at most points in 
time have a well-ordered set of  preferences, because preferences are a central part of  who 
we are, and who we are is always a work in progress. 
So sometimes our preferences are unstable just because we are not perfectly rational 
and are making mistakes about what we want. But sometimes our preferences simply change 
because we discover something new or consider hitherto absent alternatives. This type of  
discovery is not the same as scientific discovery, in which we learn something that was there, 
true at all times and waiting to be discovered. The sense of  discovery at issue here is of  a 
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kind involved in artistic creation: when Matisse painted his Dance, he was not uncovering 
something that had been there before (perhaps only in the form of  a Platonic idea); he genu-
inely created something new that had not been there at all.
This process of  creative self-discovery, which also shapes the evolution of  our pref-
erences, is most often a social rather than a solitary pursuit: it is an extended, indeed con-
tinuous, social conversation about what is good, desirable, valuable, beautiful, etc. And the 
medium of  this conversation is what Shiller calls “narrative,” i.e., a more or less integrated 
“story” that is supposed to make sense of  some otherwise obscure aspects of  social real-
ity. Some of  these narratives are better than others, and the weaker ones may lead us into 
error that distorts, more than enlightens, the reality around us. But while Shiller sometimes 
focuses on those kinds of  misleading narratives in order to explain otherwise inexplicable 
stretches of  economic history, at the root of  our openness to these narratives is not just a 
proneness to error. The main significance of  our susceptibility to the various narratives lies 
in their being part of  that continuous conversation about what goals we should be pursu-
ing, how we should live, what we should like or dislike, etc. Our whole culture is very much 
composed of  such debates, and a basic feature of  them, in a liberal society above all, is that 
they concern not just who we are, but who we want to be, what gives our life meaning, and 
where we are going. And all this is also reflected in what we pursue and the choices we make 
as economic agents and consumers. 
Which brings us back to Luther. The community, for Luther, is not an intermediary 
between our finitude and divine perfection. It cannot mediate between us and God and 
does not help us obtain salvation because salvation is an inherently individual matter. But 
then Luther is also very skeptical about our individual ability to save ourselves. Salvation 
could be “deserved” only by one’s living a morally perfect life, following the absolutely 
unbending, objective commands of  Divine Will—something that we, given our weakness, 
cannot possibly accomplish. So if  Logos (for God is also infinitely rational) and Divine 
morality is all there is, we are completely dependent on God’s mercy, and our earthly lives 
are essentially empty. But aside from the properly theological aspect of  Lutheranism (that 
we can only be saved by faith and Divine Grace), there are also the extremely interesting and 
modern practical consequences of  Luther’s postulate of  the inefficacy of  both communal 
and individual searches for righteousness and rationality. For the fact that our “works” 
cannot save us does not change the fact that we need to—indeed must—live and act, and 
in this secular sphere of  our lives, the community is very important. Our actions may be 
inherently flawed and imperfect, but we cannot just do nothing either. Somewhere between 
nothingness and eternity is our very own life that we have to live, and we can only do it by 
our own lights. The big principles that are “given” to us (the Ten Commandments) provide 
only the most basic framework of  the game we are playing—they don’t determine how to 
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play it and we don’t play it alone. How to fill our earthly existence depends on what we make 
of  ourselves, both as a community and as autonomous individuals.
The challenge to economists like Shiller, who do not want to assume that preferences 
are just “given” and that their formation is pre-economic, is thus to integrate into economics 
a more general social theory accounting for how we change and what we learn as we go. In 
this sense, an economic theory of  preference formation, as well as the role various narratives 
play in it, is not just a theory of  economic agents’ errors and their correction—it is a theory 
capable of  coming to terms with the meaning of  the continuous creative cultural process 
that contains genuine change and innovation. Edmund Phelps is perhaps the foremost 
economist to have stressed the importance of  innovation not just for economic growth, but 
perhaps above all for human flourishing and our own life-satisfaction. So to study human 
creativity inherent in economic change, we may need to expand our ideas of  what economic 
theory looks like. Should we think of  economics as containing aesthetic, historical, and 
moral dimensions? Perhaps a true economic theory of  human behavior also contains a 
whole liberal theory of  “good life,” with its constant choice, innovation, and self-creation?
